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3. The California Legislature Could Amend Section 422 to 
Address and Clarify Their Intended Scope of Protection 
VI. JURISDICTIONS OUGHT TO CAREFULLY EXAMINE THEIR CRIMINAL 
THREATS STATUTORY SCHEME AND CONSTRUCTION TO ENSURE A 
SUFFICIENT SCOPE OF PROTECTION 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The California State Legislature has amended Penal Code section 
422,1 commonly referred to as terrorist, criminal, or credible threats, 
three times since 1988.2  In doing so, the Legislature declared that “every 
person has the right to be protected from fear and intimidation,”3 
recognizing the growing number and severity of threats against 
California’s peaceful citizenry.4  Appellate courts have interpreted the 
law to require an audible utterance to accompany threatening physical 
gestures to fall within its ambit.  This is an aberrant reading of the statute 
                                                 
1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 2010).  Section 422 states the following: 
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will 
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the 
specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by 
means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, 
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face 
and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal, 
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person 
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of 
execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person reasonably to 
be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her 
immediate family’s safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison. 
For the purposes of this section, “immediate family” means any 
spouse, whether by marriage or not, parent, child, any person related 
by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, or any other 
person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the 
prior six months, regularly resided in the household. 
“Electronic communication device” includes, but is not limited to, 
telephones, cellular telephones, computers, video recorders, fax 
machines, or pagers.  “Electronic communication” has the same 
meaning as the term defined in Subsection 12 of Section 2510 of Title 18 
of the United States Code. 
Id. 
2 Id. 
3 People v. Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting People v. 
Martinez, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). 
4 Id. 
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and fails to protect a significant segment of our community, whose only 
avenue of communication is through the medium of sign language.   
This interpretation of section 422 would also provide would-be 
perpetrators, who communicate via sign language, an avenue to threaten 
others with impunity if their threats are conducted silently.  This Article 
will do the following:  (1) examine the courts’ reasoning and application 
of Penal Code section 422 in cases where hand gestures were used to 
threaten; (2) analyze the relevant portions of the statute’s construction; 
and (3) propose reasonable and logical grounds for a nuanced 
application of section 422 to threats made using American Sign 
Language. 
II.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENAL CODE 
SECTION 422 
Currently, only one California case applies Penal Code section 422 to 
a factual situation involving gestures.  In People v. Franz, the victim 
maintained a contentious, domestic, violence-filled relationship with the 
defendant.5  The defendant, a jealous boyfriend, saw the victim, her 
sister’s boyfriend, and a male friend talking on a street corner and 
confronted them.6  The victim and the two male friends got in a cab and 
left, seeking refuge at the victim’s home where they “shut . . . the 
curtains and locked all the doors.”7  Someone repeatedly called the 
victim’s home, though there was no answer.  The defendant went to the 
home and started knocking on the door.8  Receiving no response, the 
defendant attempted to gain access through a window.9 
Recognizing the defendant was not going to be dissuaded, the victim 
agreed to come outside to talk to him.10  The defendant pushed his way 
into the home, looking for the two men he had seen previously.11  The 
defendant began striking one of the men “several times” as the victim 
grabbed the cordless phone in an attempt to call the police.12  Without 
successfully notifying law enforcement, the victim ran out of the house, 
as the defendant redirected his attention toward her.13  The defendant 
gave chase, “took the phone and punched her several times, causing her 
                                                 
5 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 777–78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
6 Id. at 777. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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nose to bleed.”14  The defendant dragged her back into the home telling 
her, “I’m going to fucking kill you.”15  When law enforcement arrived, 
the victim ran outside but was too afraid of the defendant to tell the 
officer what had happened.16  Later at the hospital, she fully divulged 
what had transpired.17 
As the officers were conducting their in-field investigation and 
questioning of witnesses, the defendant positioned himself behind the 
officer and “did a gesture like this, like shush.  And then ran his finger 
across his throat.”18  The victim’s sister’s boyfriend understood the 
defendant was threatening to “slice his throat” if he continued speaking 
with the police.19  As a result, the boyfriend stopped talking and only 
shared the story of the threatening gesture later to another officer when 
the defendant was no longer present.20 
At trial, the officer testified that he had heard the “defendant utter[] 
a sound that was either ‘shush’ or ‘sh’” while making the slashing 
gesture.21  On appeal, the defendant argued there was insufficient 
evidence “to support his conviction of terrorist threats” under Penal 
Code section 422, as there was “no substantial evidence he made a 
verbal, written, or electronic statement, as required by section 422.”22  
The prosecution argued that “nonverbal conduct may constitute a 
‘statement’ within the meaning of section 422” and cited “a 
dictionary . . . definition of ‘verbal’ as including a verbal symbol.”23  The 
appellate court located an alternate dictionary definition in which 
“verbal” is defined as “concerned merely with words, as distinguished 
from facts, ideas, or actions.”24 
Based on the two definitions provided to the district court, the court 
found statutory ambiguity and turned to other avenues for 
interpretation.  The court cited People v. Snyder, which held that 
[w]hen language which is susceptible of two 
constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of this 
state is to construe the statute as favorably to the 
defendant as its language and the circumstance of its 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 777–78. 
16 Id. at 778. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 779. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 785. 
22 Id. at 781. 
23 Id. at 782. 
24 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1482 (3d college ed. 1988)). 
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application reasonably permit.  The defendant is entitled 
to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true 
interpretation of words or the construction of [the] 
statute.25 
The prosecution went as far as to argue the similarity of the 
defendant’s motions to sign language, that a “finger to lips and throat-
slashing constituted a verbal or written statement as surely as sign 
language would.”26  But the Franz court made a special point to highlight 
that “the People cite[d] no authority applying section 422 to sign 
language.”27 
The court ultimately held that there was credible evidence (the noise 
to which the officer testified, in conjunction with the throat-slashing 
gesture) constituting a threat to kill the victim if he talked to the police.28  
The court limited its holding to the facts therein and stated, “we do not 
have to decide whether section 422 requires that a defendant use a word 
in order to fulfill the requirement of a ‘statement made verbally.’”29 
This holding raises these questions:  is the court’s understanding of 
what constitutes a verbal communication too narrow, and can a person 
be statutorily threatened using solely American Sign Language as it is 
currently drafted? 
III.  THE CAUSES OF HEARING LOSS AND ITS PREVALENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Hearing loss can be divided into three main causal categories:  
(1) idiopathic- or disease-based; (2) noise-induced; and (3) age-based or 
presbycusis.  Diseases attributed to hearing loss include childhood 
infections such as mumps and measles and special infections such as 
syphilis, Lyme disease, herpes, cytomegalo virus (CMV), mononucleosis, 
chickenpox, pneumonia, influenza, and numerous other fungal 
diseases.30  “Hearing loss is one of the most common consequences of 
                                                 
25 992 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Cal. 2000) (quoting People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal. 
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783. 
27 Id. (emphasis added). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 785 (emphasis added). 
30 What Other Conditions Can Cause Hearing Loss?, EHEALTHMD, 
http://www.ehealthmd.com/library/hearingloss/HL_conditions.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2011). 
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meningitis, especially bacterial or fungal meningitis.”31  AIDS has been 
associated with ear infections leaving nerve damage.32  Individuals who 
suffer from tuberculosis, forms of arthritis like rheumatoid arthritis, 
lupus erythematosus, and diabetes often sustain hearing loss.33  These 
conditions and diseases are not race or age specific. 
There are three main types of hearing loss:  (1) conductive, 
(2) sensorineural, and (3) mixed hearing loss.34  Conductive hearing loss 
occurs in the middle or outer ear and generally leads to hard of hearing 
conditions, not deafness.35  Sensorineural hearing loss is more serious, 
occurring in the inner ear and is generally irreversible.36  Mixed hearing 
loss occurs when there is damage in the middle or outer as well as 
damage in the inner ear.37 
The communities of individuals who are hard of hearing or deaf 
represent a significant portion of our society.  According to Gallaudet 
University statistics, hearing loss is an extremely common disability that 
                                                 
31 Id.; see also Hearing Loss:  Risk Factors, MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 22, 2009), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/hearing-loss/DS00172/DSECTION=risk-factors 
(listing risk factors, including meningitis, that could lead to hearing loss). 
32 See What Other Conditions Can Cause Hearing Loss?, supra note 30 (“Conductive and 
sensorineural hearing loss both occur in people with AIDS. AIDS is also associated with 
tumors in the head and neck that can cause hearing loss.”). 
33 Id. 
34 Types of Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/ 
public/hearing/disorders/types.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
35 Conductive Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha. 
org/public/hearing/Conductive-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  The article 
states that 
[c]onductive hearing loss occurs when sound is not conducted 
efficiently through the outer ear canal to the eardrum and the tiny 
bones (ossicles) of the middle ear.  Conductive hearing loss usually 
involves a reduction in sound level or the ability to hear faint sounds.  
This type of hearing loss can often be corrected medically or surgically. 
Id. 
36 Sensorineural Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha. 
org/public/hearing/Sensorineural-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  This type of 
hearing loss 
occurs when there is damage to the inner ear (cochlea), or to the nerve 
pathways from the inner ear to the brain.  Most of the time, 
[sensorineural hearing loss (“SNHL”)] cannot be medically or 
surgically corrected.  This is the most common type of permanent 
hearing loss.  SNHL reduces the ability to hear faint sounds.  Even 
when speech is loud enough to hear, it may still be unclear or sound 
muffled. 
Id. (listing possible causes of SNHL such as illnesses, exposure to loud music, aging, head 
trauma, and the use of drugs that are toxic to hearing). 
37 Mixed Hearing Loss, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/ 
public/hearing/Mixed-Hearing-Loss/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2011). 
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affects more than three percent or 11.8 million Americans.38  According 
to a recent study by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher 
Education (“WICHE”),39 at a number of 3,086,866, California has the 
highest population of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, “more than 
five times that of the next largest state” population of deaf and hard of 
hearing.40  The 3,086,866 deaf and hard of hearing individuals constitutes 
8.6 percent of California’s population.41  As with most disabilities, there 
is a spectrum of persons who are hard of hearing and deaf in terms of 
severity.  A significant segment of these citizens are classified as 
“culturally deaf,” meaning their first native language is sign language; a 
number of “culturally deaf” citizens only communicate through some 
form of sign language.42 
IV.  PENAL CODE SECTION 422 HAS A POTENTIAL LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD 
ALLOW A PERPETRATOR TO THREATEN THEIR VICTIMS WITH IMPUNITY 
In 1989, sections 422 and 646.9 were amended, adding the term 
“electronic communication device” as a prohibited conduit by which to 
                                                 
38 FAQ:  Deaf Population of Individual States, Territories, & Localities, GALLAUDET U. (July 
2004), http://library.gallaudet.edu/Library/Deaf_Research_Help/Frequently_Asked_ 
Questions_(FAQs)/Statistics_on_Deafness/Deaf_Population_of_Individual_States_Territor
ies_and_Localities.html.  The following statistical data is based off the 1994–95 United 
States Census Bureau data collection and is an estimated population (from greatest to least) 
of deaf and hard of hearing by state:  California (1,169,273); New York (823,173); Florida 
(809,571); Texas (727,512); Pennsylvania (624,061); Ohio (520,965); Illinois (512,818); 
Michigan (426,772); New Jersey (357,699); North Carolina (340,459); Georgia (298,185); 
Virginia (288,546); Massachusetts (286,122); Tennessee (267,724); Indiana (261,117); 
Missouri (255,930); Wisconsin (234,452); Washington (221,077); Maryland (219,702); 
Alabama (217,915); Kentucky (209,772); Minnesota (201,666); Louisiana (200,437); 
Oklahoma (175,799); South Carolina (168,600); Arizona (167,652); Connecticut (153,573); 
Iowa (144,346); Oregon (143,755); Mississippi (142,001); Arkansas (140,625); Colorado 
(131,358); Kansas (117,430); West Virginia (115,491); Nebraska (76,506); Utah (62,299); 
Maine (61,836); New Mexico (58,420); Nevada (54,195); Rhode Island (51,118); New 
Hampshire (48,970); Hawaii (47,817); Idaho (46,424); Montana (39,433); South Dakota 
(34,849); Delaware (33,184); North Dakota (31,362); Vermont (25,618); District of Columbia 
(25,214); Wyoming (19,135); and Alaska (15,877).  Id. 
39 W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR HIGHER EDUC., http://www.wiche.edu/ (last visited Jan. 
24, 2011).  “WICHE and its 15 member states work to improve access to higher education 
and ensure student success.  [Their] student exchange programs, regional initiatives, 
and . . . research and policy work allow [WICHE] to assist constituents throughout the 
West and beyond.”  Id. 
40 W. INTERSTATE COMM’N FOR HIGHER EDUC. MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM, INFORMATION 
GAPS ON THE DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING POPULATION:  A BACKGROUND PAPER 6 (May 
2006), available at http://www.wiche.edu/info/publications/InformationGapsResearch 
Paper.pdf. 
41 Id. at 14. 
42 Hearing Impairment vs. Deafness, AUDIOLOGY AWARENESS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.audiologyawareness.com/hearinfo_impairdeaf.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2010). 
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stalk and communicate criminal threats.43  In the Franz case, the 
defendant argued that if the California Legislature intended so, they 
could have expressly amended section 422 to include nonverbal 
communication.44  The defense pointed to the language of Penal Code 
section 646.9(g), which defines a possible course of conduct for a stalking 
credible threat as “a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a 
combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated 
statements and conduct.”45  The court agreed with the defendant’s 
contention, finding the Legislature did not intend section 422 to include 
nonverbal gestures as prohibited conduct.46 
This analogy, drawn by the defense, is fundamentally defective.  
Stalking, by its nature, is a pattern of prohibited physical conduct that is 
designed to harass or place another in a constant state of fear or 
paranoia, whereas a terrorist threat is a credible communication of 
imminent peril designed to place another into a present state of 
apprehension of bodily harm.  To compare and analogize the statutory 
construction of these two sections is an error.  The actus reus prohibited 
by law for these crimes are different; therefore, statutory language 
describing the prohibited conduct would naturally prohibit different 
forms of physical action.  The 1998 amendment updating these sections 
of the Penal Code was the Legislature’s attempt to keep pace with 
technology (e.g., internet chat rooms and text messaging) and was not 
designed to alter the fundamental tenets of the prohibited actus reus.47 
A fair reading of the court’s reasoning in Franz would allow a 
perpetrator to make terrorist threats, made with the specific intent to 
place another in imminent fear of physical violence, and to escape 
prosecution of this assault as long as they did not use a form of writing 
or failed to make an audible sound.  The perpetrator need not intend to 
communicate with a person who is deaf or hard of hearing, but just be an 
individual who understands the threatening sign language and was 
placed in a state of reasonable apprehension of harm.  This analysis 
described in Franz gives a clever, inventive, and well-advised perpetrator 
the opportunity to threaten people with impunity. 
                                                 
43 S.B. 1796, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/97-
98/bill/sen/sb_1751-1800/sb_1796_bill_19980925_chaptered.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010).  “An act to amend Section 1708.7 of the Civil Code, and to amend Sections 422, 646.9, 
and 653m of the Penal Code, relating to stalking.”  Id. 
44 People v. Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
45 CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 2010). 
46 Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782–83. 
47 Cal. S.B. 1796. 
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V.  OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO BETTER PERFECT AND FACILITATE THE ORIGINAL 
INTENT UNDERPINNING PENAL CODE SECTION 422 
A. Penal Code Section 422 Is Not Ambiguous and the Statutory Terms 
Therein Ought to Be Credited with Their Proper Definitions in Order to 
Effectuate the Intended Application of the Law 
Although the Legislature could have used more precise and explicit 
terminology, the language currently codified adequately conveys 
grounds for terrorist threats communicated via sign language to be 
prosecuted under Penal Code section 422. 
When the court interprets the effect of a statute, they are guided by 
the axiom that words will be given their plain language meaning48 and 
understood in the context in which they are constructed.49  The court in 
Franz grappled with the term “verbal” in its analysis and by its own 
account found two “differing dictionary definitions”:  first, “as including 
a verbal symbol”50 and second, “concerned merely with words, as 
distinguished from facts, ideas, or actions.”51  Finding ambiguity in the 
statutory construction, the court was guided by People v. Snyder, which 
held that when language in a penal law is susceptible of two 
constructions, the language will be construed favorably to the defendant, 
thus receiving the benefit of the doubt in interpreting words or the 
construction of a statute.52 
These two definitions are complementary, not contradictory.  A 
written language is a compilation of characters which the reader has 
                                                 
48 This axiom is also known as the rule of lenity.  See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 
350, 375 (1987) (“The doctrine of lenity is, of course, sound, for the citizen is entitled to fair 
notice of what sort of conduct may give rise to punishment.”); see also Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v. United States, 504 
U.S. 255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 
(1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same). 
49 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, 
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is 
plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-
making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms. 
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, 
the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid 
doubtful meanings need no discussion. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
50 Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782. 
51 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1482 (3d college ed. 1988)); see also 
supra notes 23?24 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the term “verbal”). 
52 992 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Cal. 2000) (quoting People v. Overstreet, 231 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. 
1986)). 
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associated with audible tones and/or sounds.  The first definition the 
court cited should be understood to mean an expression of letters and/or 
characters that build meaningful words.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“verbal” as an adjective which is “[o]f, relating to, or expressed in 
words.”53  “Symbol” has been defined as a “letter, character, [or] sign of 
written communication.”54 
Here, a word would be an amalgamation of letters or characters 
made with the intent of communicating through a written medium.  The 
first definition is a definition by example, giving the reader an example 
of the form in which a verbal statement may occur.  The second 
definition serves the reader as a limiter, or definition by exclusion.  In 
this definition, the author is attempting to convey to the reader what a 
word is not.  Here the definition attempts to convey to the reader that 
words are not intangible things like ideas or actions.  These definitions 
are not vague, ambiguous, or contradictory.  Rather, they attempt to give 
meaning to the same term by approaching it from alternate definitional 
angles.  The terms used in Penal Code section 422 are not ambiguous and 
should be given their full definitional credit and not be framed by our 
colloquial usage. 
B. The Term “Verbal” Is Not Synonymous with the Word “Audible” 
The court in Franz, makes an assumption that the statutory word 
“verbal,” used in Penal Code section 422, has the same definition as the 
word “audible.”  It does not. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “verbal” as an adjective which is “[o]f, 
relating to, or expressed in words.”55  It is not until the alternate or 
second definition, “[l]oosely, of, relating to, or expressed in spoken 
words,”56 that there is any indication of the manner in which the words 
are communicated.  Contrast the expression in words to the Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary definition of “audible”:  “heard or capable of being 
heard.”57  These two words are closely related, in that they are describing 
language and its transmission; however, the definition for “verbal” is 
focused on the speaker’s means of communication of an idea, and the 
definition for “audible” is centered on the mode of reception of another’s 
idea.  This would indicate that, while nuanced, these words are 
                                                 
53 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1696 (9th ed. 2009). 
54 Symbol, THESAURAUS.COM, http://thesaurus.com/browse/symbol (last visited June 
28, 2010). 
55 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1696. 
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
57 Audible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/audible (last visited June 28, 2010). 
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describing different components of a transmission of an idea or thought.  
In short, “verbal” means expressed in words, and “audible” means the 
capability of being heard.  The court has confused these two definitions, 
assuming they are synonymous; they are not. 
Meaning can be conveyed by words through numerous forms of 
transmission.  American Sign Language (“ASL”) is globally recognized 
and is a popular medium for conveying words and ideas for those who 
are deaf or hard of hearing.  Specifically, the “culturally deaf”58 utilize 
ASL as their sole mode of communication.59 
C. American Sign Language Is a Fully Recognized Foreign Language and As 
Such, a Concrete Form of Communication, Which Should Be Considered an 
Adequate Conduit of Expression to Satisfy the “Verbal” Transmission 
Element of Penal Code Section 422 
ASL uses visually transmitted signal patterns rather than 
acoustically transmitted sound patterns to convey meaning.60  With its 
origins rooted in seventeenth century Martha’s Vineyard where a large 
and disproportionate percentage of the population was deaf,61 ASL has 
become the fourth most widely used and understood language within 
the United States.62  ASL contains phonology,63 morphology,64 
                                                 
58 CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA:  VOICES FROM A CULTURE (1988) 
(explaining that people who are culturally deaf are (1) audiologically deaf or hard of 
hearing, (2) use a sign language, and (3) identify themselves with the larger cultural 
group). 
59 Hearing Impairment vs. Deafness, supra note 42. 
60 Sign Language and Deaf Communication Methods and Information, DISABLED WORLD, 
http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/types/hearing/communication/ (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2010). 
61 The History of American Sign Language, START AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE, 
http://www.start-american-sign-language.com/history-of-american-sign-language.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2011).  Hartford, Connecticut, was the home to Dr. Mason Cogswell 
who recruited a local minister, Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet, to help educate his deaf 
daughter, Alice.  Id.  In 1815, Gallaudet traveled to Europe in search of a method to help 
young Alice.  Id.  Gallaudet traveled to Paris where he was exposed to the educational 
methods of the National Institute for Deaf-Mutes which taught sign language.  Id.  After 
returning from his journey, Gallaudet started his own school for the deaf named the 
American Asylum for Deaf-Mutes (modern day American School for the Deaf).  Id. 
62 American Sign Language, MEDICINENET, http://www.medicinenet.com/sign_ 
language/article.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
63 Stephen R. Anderson, Phonology, http://bloch.ling.yale.edu/Files/Phonology.htm 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  Phonology is 
the study of the sound structure of units (morphemes, words, phrases, 
utterances) within individual languages.  Its goal is to elucidate the 
system of distinctions in sound which differentiate such units within a 
particular language, and the range of realizations of a given unit’s 
sound structure as a function of the shape of other units in its context. 
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semantics,65 syntax,66 and pragmatics,67 analogous to spoken languages.68  
Where spoken languages are produced by the vocal cords and can be 
duplicated in a linear written format, ASL is three-dimensional.69  ASL 
simultaneously combines hand shapes, spatial orientation, and 
movement of the hands, arms, or body, and facial expressions to fluidly 
express a communicator’s thoughts and emotions.70 
1. California Recognizes the Benefits and Virtues of Sign Language as 
Reflected by Its Specific Inclusion in Numerous Statutes and Its 
Recognition as a Foreign Language in Many of the State’s Schools 
and Colleges 
California law generally embraces sign language as an integral and 
trusted means of communication in judicial proceedings.  California 
Evidence Code section 754(b) states that “proceedings shall be 
interpreted in a language that the individual who is deaf or hearing 
impaired understands by a qualified interpreter appointed by the court 
or other appointing authority.”71  The section goes on to clarify that a 
sign language interpreter is a type of “interpreter”72 and that 
‘intermediary interpreter’ means an individual who is 
deaf or hearing impaired, or a hearing individual who is 
able to assist in providing an accurate interpretation 
between spoken English and sign language or between 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
64 Morphology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/morphology (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).  Morphology is “a study and 
description of word formation (as inflection, derivation, and compounding) in language.”  
Id. 
65 Semantics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/semantics?show=0&t=1283895331 (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).  Semantics is 
described in an alternate definition as “the meaning or relationship of meanings of a sign or 
set of signs; especially:  connotative meaning.”  Id. 
66 Syntax, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/syntax (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).  Syntax is “the way in which linguistic 
elements (as words) are put together to form constituents (as phrases or clauses).”  Id. 
67 Pragmatics, OHIO ST. U., http://www.ling.ohio-state.edu/~kdk/201/spring02/ 
slides/pragmatics-4up.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).  “Pragmatics is the study of how 
language is used and of the effect of context on language.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
68 American Sign Language Linguistic Research Project, BOSTON U., http://www.bu.edu/ 
asllrp/ (last visited June 28, 2010). 
69 Wendy Sandler, Symbiotic Symbolization by Hand and Mouth in Sign Language, 
SEMIOTICA, Apr. 2009, at 241 (Ger.). 
70 Id. 
71 CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2010). 
72 Id. § 754(d). 
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variants of sign language or between American Sign 
Language and other foreign languages by acting as an 
intermediary between the individual who is deaf or 
hearing impaired and the qualified interpreter.73 
Here, the legislature has rightfully placed its reliance in ASL to help 
mitigate and guard against due process challenges that criminal 
defendants may assert.  The Legislature also gives great significance to 
sign language interpreters, as they are an integral conduit for the deaf 
and hard of hearing while testifying, helping them to relay their 
observations to the finder of fact. 
A vast and growing number of schools and universities regard ASL 
as an acceptable substitute for foreign language requirements, and 
California is no exception.74  California Education Code section 
51225.3(a)(1)(E) expressly states the following:  “For the purposes of 
satisfying the requirement [that a student complete one course in foreign 
language], a course in American Sign Language shall be deemed a 
course in foreign language.”75  Currently, more than a dozen California 
universities accept ASL as a suitable proxy for foreign language 
matriculation requirements.76 
2. The Transmission/Communication Element of Penal Code Section 
422 Should Be Given the Same or Similar Consideration as the 
Totality of Surrounding Circumstances Analysis Courts Have 
Applied to the Unconditional/Unequivocal Element 
California courts have looked to the surrounding facts and special 
characteristics of the parties, applying a totality of circumstances 
analysis, when assessing whether a threat falls within the prescription of 
the unconditional and unequivocal elements of Penal Code section 422.77  
Courts have chosen this approach because it best furthers the legislative 
intent of protecting “every person . . . from fear and intimidation.”78  It 
would additionally advance the Legislature’s intent to apply the same 
totality of circumstances analysis when applying the transmission or 
communication element of the statute. 
                                                 
73 Id. § 754(e). 
74 Sherman Wilcox, Universities That Accept ASL in Fulfillment of Foreign Language 
Requirements, WASH. STATE-AM. SIGN LANGUAGE TEACHER’S ASS’N, 
http://www.waaslta.org/U_accepts_ASL_Wilcox%5B1%5D.pdf (last visited June 28, 
2010). 
75 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51225.3(a)(1)(E) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
76 Wilcox, supra note 74. 
77 People v. Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 464, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
78 Id. (quoting People v. Martinez, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). 
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In People v. Martinez, the court allowed the jury to consider evidence 
of the defendant’s subsequent actions, setting fire to a building where 
the victim worked a day after the defendant had made the charged 
threat.79  The appellate court agreed with the defense that the threat, in a 
vacuum, may not have conveyed a threat to commit great harm, but held 
the trier of fact could consider all of the surrounding circumstances in 
deciding whether the threat was ardent when conferred.80 
In People v. Mendoza,81 the court also allowed the trier of fact to 
evaluate peripheral information, expanding the scope to include unique 
and subjective characteristics of the specific party’s personal history.82  
Here, shortly after the charged threat was made, members of the 
defendant’s gang parked their vehicle in front of the victim’s home and 
honked the horn to gain her attention.83  This evidence was submitted to 
show the lack of ambiguity of the threat, as the victim knew that the 
defendant was a gang member and his threats should not be understood 
as hollow. 
The above are examples of the court utilizing the tools of logic and 
reason to achieve the maximum desired effect of a statute.  It behooves 
the court to employ this same framework of analysis when applying the 
verbal element of Penal Code section 422.  In doing so, they would be 
able to allow the trier of fact to understand the communication patterns 
of the deaf and hard of hearing communities and to appreciate that sign 
language is their form of verbalization, thus making threatening sign 
language subject to Penal Code section 422 culpability. 
3. The California Legislature Could Amend Section 422 to Address and 
Clarify Their Intended Scope of Protection 
One avenue available to remedy Penal Code section 422’s deficiency 
is to amend the existing codified language.  The California Legislature 
has amended Penal Code section 422 several times since its initial 
enactment.  These changes have updated the Code to encompass and 
keep pace with technological advancements.  The Legislature could 
easily amend it again, so as to ensure protection for the deaf and hard of 
hearing.  Although the legislative process is often cumbersome and 
                                                 
79 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
80 Id. 
81 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
82 Solis, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473–74 (citing Mendoza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732?34). 
83 Id. at 474. 
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fraught with political detours, new and explicit language would serve as 
the most effective and legally clear option.84 
VI.  JURISDICTIONS OUGHT TO CAREFULLY EXAMINE THEIR CRIMINAL 
THREATS STATUTORY SCHEME AND CONSTRUCTION TO ENSURE A SUFFICIENT 
SCOPE OF PROTECTION 
Many jurisdictions have codified similar language to California’s 
Penal Code section 422; however, they have adopted broader expressive 
language, selecting the term “communicate” or “conduct.”85  The election 
                                                 
84 The following is the existing statutory language, followed by two proposals for 
alternative statutory language with added language in italics: 
Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will 
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the 
specific intent that the statement, made verbally, in writing, or by 
means of an electronic communication device, is to be taken as a threat, 
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out. 
Cal. Penal Code § 422 (West 2010). 
 
Amended language option 1:  “Any person who willfully threatens to 
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to 
another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made 
verbally, made visually, in writing, or by means of an electronic 
communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no 
intent of actually carrying it out.” 
 
Amended language option 2:  “Any person who willfully threatens to 
commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to 
another person, with the specific intent that the statement, made 
verbally, in writing, by means of an electronic communication device, 
or conducted through American Sign Language, is to be taken as a threat, 
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out.” 
 
Depending on the language adopted, this code section, as amended, could be an 
opportunity to encompass threats communicated with street gang hand signals.  While this 
expansion would confer additional protection for California citizenry, it could have an 
unattended negative correlative effect on charging and plea agreements for prosecutors.  
The lesser count of a criminal threat is a “strike” qualifying act, while the completed 
threatened act may not be.  This dichotomy drastically complicates plea negotiations. 
85 Criminal threats are classified and labeled differently state by state.  Threatening 
actions can be found under menacing charges.  In Oregon, “menacing” is defined as 
follows:  “(1) A person commits the crime of menacing if by word or conduct the person 
intentionally attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.”  
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.190(1) (2009).  They can also be found under assault charges and 
intimidation charges.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) 
(defining “Intimidation” as “[a] person who communicates a threat to another person, with 
the intent . . . that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act.”).  
It furthermore can be found under its own standalone enumerated crime.  See, e.g., KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-3419(a)(1) (Supp. 2009) (defining “Criminal threat” as “any threat to:  (1) 
Commit violence communicated with intent to terrorize another, or to cause the 
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of these terms allows the courts broader discretion when applying the 
statutory language.   
Kansas court holdings include the following understandings:  that 
“[c]ommunicated intent can be inferred from physical acts as well as 
verbal statements;”86 that “[a]ll circumstances surrounding the 
communication, including the relationship between the parties, must be 
considered in determining whether the communication in issue is a 
terroristic threat;”87 and that in order to come within the purview of the 
statute, making it unlawful to communicate a terroristic threat, the threat 
need not be in any particular form or in any particular words.88  
Although there is no case law specifically addressing the issue of 
threatening sign language, these holdings may provide grounds to find 
culpability in threats made by way of signing.  Jurisdictions that have 
deficient language or uninformed interpreting case law may need to 
amend their statutes or advocate for a comprehensive judicial review to 
ensure adequate protection for the deaf or hard of hearing. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
California courts have given strong indications that Penal Code 
section 422 may require threatening gestures to be accompanied by an 
audible utterance in order to attach culpability.89  This statutory reading 
fails to protect a significant segment of our community that uses the 
medium of sign language to communicate.  This construction of Penal 
Code section 422 provides would-be perpetrators, who verbalize via sign 
language, an avenue to threaten others with impunity if conducted 
silently.  As codified, section 422 does provide adequate grounds for 
terrorist threats communicated via sign language to be prosecuted. 
Though the outcome in Franz would not have been dissimilar if any 
of the above proposals had been applied, the court’s analysis provides 
precious insight into its understanding of how Penal Code section 422 
would be interpreted in the future.  Without a finding of credible 
evidence that the defendant made an audible sound, they might find 
future charges lacking in foundation, leading to preliminary dismissals.  
The court’s explanation and understanding of this statute is dangerous, 
                                                                                                             
evacuation, lock down or disruption in regular, ongoing activities of any building, place of 
assembly or facility of transportation, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
terror or evacuation”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 422. 
86 State v. Cope, 29 P.3d 974, 978 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
87 State v. Abu-Isba, 685 P.2d 856, 863 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
88 State v. Knight, 549 P.2d 1397 (Kan. Ct. App. 1976). 
89 People v. Franz, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
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and future application, as intimated, could obfuscate the spirit and intent 
of the law. 
From the California Legislature’s 1998 amending of section 422 to 
encapsulate and expand its protection to the advancements in electronic 
communication, it is reasonable to infer that this was a comprehensive 
attempt to encompass all legitimate forms of word transfer.  Why would 
the Legislature intend Penal Code section 422 to leave the deaf or hard of 
hearing unprotected when threatened through sign language?  There is 
no reasonable or logical explanation to believe that the Legislature 
would not have intended to protect one of the most vulnerable segments 
of our society.  While a nuanced understanding of the law is required for 
a proper administration of justice, so too is it required to ensure proper 
protection for its intended class. 
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